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Abstract 
 
This paper studies signs and reasons of decline of job stability in West Germany. 
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984-1997, we look at two 
measures for job stability. Based on repeated cross sectional data we first show that 
medium elapsed tenure declined for men. Secondly, we find that the measure of 
completed job duration can efficiently be used, to distinguish reasons for job 
termination and to surpass the problem of right censoring. Estimating hazard models 
with competing risks, we show that the decline in job stability of men can be 
attributed primarily to an increase in layoffs. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In the recent past the question of job security and the stability of employment 
relationships has been increasingly discussed. The general notion is that job stability 
is on the decline in most OECD countries, although the actual empirical evidence is 
scarce and ambiguous. Several studies for Germany and other OECD countries like 
the United States and the United Kingdom show some limited evidence of increasing 
job instability (compare Bergemann and Schneider 1998; Burgess and Rees 1996, 
1997, 1998; Swinnerton and Wial 1995; Diebold et al. 1997; Schmidt and Svorny 
1998 and the articles in JOLE 17,4 part 2; OECD 1997; ILO 1996).  
 
It is well known to economists that job stability is not necessarily always a good 
thing. Indeed if we believed that separations were always efficient (see e.g. 
McLaughlin 1991 or Parsons 1986) there would be nothing to worry about. 
However, most contracting mechanisms like a bonding scheme or a fixed wage 
contract such as in the early models by Oi (1962), Becker (1962) and Parsons (1972) 
or later models with costly or suppressed renegotiations of wages by Hashimoto 
(1981) and Hall and Lazear (1984) will yield separations that are not efficient. 
Moreover, too much job stability could be harmful at the macroeconomic level, if 
e.g. firms have difficulties restructuring their workforce in times of structural change. 
Indeed job relationships in Europe have often been termed too inflexible; just like 
labor market institutions per se, which is sometimes summarized in the term 
Eurosclerosis. Even at the individual level job stability is not always desirable as the 
existence of voluntary quits obviously reveal.  
 
One major reason for some economists to be concerned about declines in job stability 
is the potential effect on individual career paths as too many job switches and 
interrupting unemployment spells may lead to losses in human capital, decreasing 
earnings potentials and limited capability to obtain work due to disadvantage signals 
(Spence 1973). Furthermore, economy wide long-term labor relationships might be 
one prerequisite for a highly educated workforce (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998), 
which is partly responsible for the economic success of a country. Therefore, careful 
interpretation of likely declines is important and especially the question of whether it 
is quits or layoffs causing it. Another important question is how to measure a 
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potential decline in job stability properly. We will try to give answers to these 
questions using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (hereafter GSOEP).1    
 
After surveying very briefly the literature on job stability we give a description of the 
data set GSOEP. We then proceed to a detailed analysis of elapsed firm tenure. 
Elapsed firm tenure of those currently in work is the most commonly used measure 
of job stability and has not been properly explored for Germany before. The GSOEP 
data show that there has indeed been a considerable decline in elapsed tenure in West 
Germany between 1984 and 1997. However, one serious problem of elapsed tenure 
is, that it does not take into account the problem of right censoring. We do not know 
how long jobs will actually last. This is especially a problem in times when many 
new hires are made. In this case average elapsed tenure will show a decline. To 
surpass the problem of right censoring we use competing risk hazard rate models in 
our major analysis of separation risks in Section 3. These models show that the 
decline in job stability can be attributed primarily to an increase in layoffs. Our final 
Section 4 summarizes the findings and draws a conclusion.  
                                                 
1 In a companion paper (Mertens and Bergemann 2000), we further analyze the question of whether 
different groups in the labor market are differently affected by a potential decline in job stability. 
Insiders who switch jobs could have different job stability patterns than outsiders who enter the labor 
market from unemployment or non-participation.  
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2 General Trends in Job Stability 
2.1 The Literature 
The literature on job stability is primarily empirical,2 though it certainly rests on the 
well-known theories describing mobility in the labor market. Human capital theory 
offers an explanation for why separations usually decline with labor market 
experience and tenure (see e.g. Becker 1962, Mincer 1962 and 1974, Oi 1962, 
Parsons 1972 and Hashimoto 1981). Search and matching theory also concludes that 
mobility decreases with tenure and experience, as good matches are the ones who 
survive the longest and older workers have simply had more time to locate well-
payed jobs (see e.g. Stigler 1962, Mortensen 1970, Burdett 1978, Jovanovic 1979a, 
1979b).3 Therefore, it seems reasonable to use as a common measure of job stability 
the elapsed tenure of those currently employed, i.e. the time spent with a particular 
employer. If we find a general tendency of decreasing average tenure over time, this 
will be interpreted as an indication of declining job stability.  
 
Most of the original US studies found little evidence for a drop in job stability 
between the 1970s and the early 1990s (see Farber 1995; Diebold et al. 1996, 1997).4 
Only Swinnerton and Wial (1995, 1996) reported declines in job stability although 
far lower in their reestimated results. Farber (1995) notes that men are increasingly 
less likely to be found at long term job relationships while women's probability of 
being at such increased significantly. Moreover, Farber concludes that groups with 
greater declines in earnings such as the young and especially the less educated 
experienced a greater decline in job stability. In more recent studies, some more 
evidence of declining job stability has been found. Newmark et al. (1999) report that 
job stability declined modestly in the first half of the 1990s. However, men with 
substantial tenure experienced a sharp decline in job stability during the first half of 
the 1990s. These results were confirmed by Jaeger and Stevens (1999) who show a 
declining fraction of workers with less than 10 years of tenure. However, Gottschalk 
and Moffitt (1999) do not find such evidence when estimating Cox Proportional 
                                                 
2 One exception being Valetta (1999b), who offers an implicit contract model to explain inefficient 
separations. In this model declining job security for workers occurs if they are dismissed although 
they had reasonable expectations of not being dismissed. 
3 See Mertens (1998) for an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on job mobility. 
4 For overviews of the literature in the U.S. see Schmidt and Svorny (1998) or Valetta (1999a). See 
also the special issue on the topic of the Journal of Labor Economics 17 (October 1999, part 2) where 
Gottschalk and Moffit present an interesting comparison of studies. Comparable studies for Europe 
only exist in the UK (see Burgess and Rees 1996, 1997, 1998).  
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Hazard Rate Models for different demographic groups. Separation rates do not 
increase and they observe that for white males the coefficients indicate a decline in 
the hazard for all education groups. These general results remain even if only those 
workers who report involuntary job terminations are looked at. 
 
Finally, the literature on worker displacement shows that job loss increased since the 
1970's, which increasingly affects more and more also high tenure and white collar 
workers (see Hamermesh 1989; Farber 1993, 1997; Hall 1995; Fallick 1996 and 
Kletzer 1998 for surveys). The facts reported by e.g. Farber (1997) cast some doubts 
on the notion that job stability did not change: job loss in the recession of 1981-1983 
constituted about 13% of the workforce. The three-year rate of job loss decreased 
until the period 1987-89 and then rose to the highest level since 1981: 15% of the 
workforce lost their job in a period of expansion between 1993 and 1995. As Kletzer 
(1998) puts it, "These high rates of job loss are consistent with public perceptions of 
rising job insecurity".  
 
The studies for Germany up to the present date have used differing measures, which 
come to apparently opposing results. Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1998) report 
decreasing numbers of job changes as evidence for an increase in job stability while 
Bergemann and Schneider (1998) use descriptive duration analysis to show that job 
stability declined. Prolonged times of unemployment and non-participation might 
bring the results into accord. Here we intend to give a detailed overview on the 
evolution of job duration, which starts, with the presentation of some statistics and 
graphs on elapsed tenure to get a grip on the information in the GSOEP data.  
 
2.2 The Data Set  
The GSOEP is a representative panel survey of households and their members, which 
has been collected for West Germany since 1984. The concept of the GSOEP is to 
annually re-interview the households and their split-offs usually in March.5 In 1984, 
the sample consisted of approximately 4500 households and 9000 persons. The 
questionnaire of the GSOEP covers a wide variety of economic and social  
                                                 
5 For further information about the GSOEP consult: German Institute for Economic Studies, DIW 
(1998). 
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characteristics of households and their members. In particular, the occupational 
situation of the interviewees is one of the main themes. Hardly any other German 
data set offers this variety of information, especially on the reasons why a job is 
terminated. 
 
The information used to calculate the median of elapsed tenure is taken from the 
answers to the question on the time the employee has already spend with his/her 
current employer. However, the extraction of the spell data on job duration for the 
duration analysis is not as trivial as it seems to be. Workers report changes of the 
employment situation in the year before or during the year of the interview. With the 
help of this information we trace the job back to the point of time when it started. In 
the consecutive waves, we check whether and why jobs possibly ended. In this way, 
jobs, which cover the minimum of one interview date, can be detected. As the 
GSOEP offers the relevant information only since the beginning of 1985 only spells, 
which began in the time period between 1985 and 1995, could be taken into 
consideration. The observation period ends in December 1996. There exists a 
problem if more than one job change occurred between two interview dates. In this 
case, the exact termination date of the first job is not available. Therefore, these job 
spells must be handled as right censored, as are the jobs, which end without a reason 
and dropouts.  
 
The analysis distinguishes three different destination states: Quits, which are initiated 
by the employee, layoffs, which are initiated by the firm, and a third category, here 
called ‘other reasons’ that include such reasons as the end of limited term contract 
and retirement. It also includes sabbatical leave and maternity leave if it is 
understood as termination of the job. 
 
2.3 The Empirical Analysis of Elapsed Tenure 
Table 1 shows the well-known fact that median elapsed tenure differs significantly 
by gender. While men's median tenure starts with 10.7 years in 1984 and ends with 
9.3 years in 1997 women's median tenure is relatively constant at around 6.5 years. 
Now, it is important to distinguish different age groups because obviously older 
workers are able to accrue longer tenure than young workers. Age is therefore used 
as a (non-ideal) proxy for labor market experience. Median elapsed tenure is reported 
for the groups 16-25 years, 26-45 years and 46-65 years in Figure 1. The difference 
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between men and women is evident only in the older age groups. Younger female 
workers between 16 and 25 have tenure comparable to men. What is more striking, 
however, is that median elapsed tenure decreases for the young and middle aged men 
between 25 and 45 but increases substantially for male workers between 46 and 65. 
The female experience is strikingly different from the results reported by Farber 
(1995), Marcotte (1995) and Burgess and Rees (1998) for the United States and the 
UK. It seems that while women in the US and the UK were able to accrue longer 
tenure over time, German women were only able to hold the level already acquired in 
the mid-1980s. 
 
Another interesting detail of the tenure pattern has been pointed out by Gregg and 
Wadsworth (1995). They show for the UK that median elapsed tenure for part-timers 
and full-timers differs significantly. Moreover, part-timers face increasing separation 
probabilities over time. Therefore, Figure 2 shows median elapsed tenure by regular 
hours worked. Men in part-time jobs and marginal employment6 obviously have 
lower median elapsed tenure than full-time workers, however only around 3% of 
male workers can be found in these two categories (own calculations from the 
GSOEP, see also Hoffmann and Walwei 1998). Median tenure calculated for other 
than full-time male workers is very erratic and the observed decline in median tenure 
therefore seems to be due to decreasing median tenure in full-time employment.7 As 
would have been expected women are more frequently found in part-time work 
(around 30%). It is interesting to see that this type of work is even associated with 
slightly higher median tenure than full-time work and there are no clear tendencies 
over time for the three employment types.  
 
Similarly, tenure by industry differs more strongly for men than for women as can be 
seen from Figure 3 where the most important sectors are depicted. In trade, services 
and manufacturing median tenure decreased by 1 to 2 years between 1984 and 1997. 
In the state sector median tenure even increased. This is probably due to reduced 
hiring by the state. 
 
                                                 
6 There are strict definitions for marginal employment in Germany. Working either below 15 hours or 
receiving monthly wages of only 620 DM (margin since 1998).  
7 In 1988 around 3000 male workers are observed in full-time employment and only around 60 in 
part-time or marginal employment.  
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Knowing that there has been a considerable decline in the median elapsed tenure for 
men we still do not know what the potential reasons are and therefore we have no 
hint of whether this is a positive or worrisome finding. Considering the business 
cycle we know that (voluntary) quits are pro-cyclical, while (involuntary) layoffs are 
counter-cyclical both influencing the tenure distribution. In boom periods more new 
jobs are created which leads automatically to more jobs with short duration. Hence, 
tenure decreases usually even if layoffs are reduced. In recessions there will be more 
layoffs, less quits, and average tenure is likely to increase as new hires are rare 
(Burgess and Rees 1996, Schettkatt 1996). Between 1984 and 1989 the West German 
economy recovered from a recession in the early 80s leading to falling 
unemployment rates and slightly better job prospects for workers as can be seen from 
Figure 4. In 1990, the year of re-unification, however, there has been a pronounced 
boom bringing capacities in West Germany to their limits. This was primarily due to 
increasing demand for West German products in East Germany. This boom ended 
dramatically in 1993 followed by a recession from which the West German economy 
has recovered very slowly since then. Unemployment in West Germany has 
increased and growth rates are at relatively low levels. Concerning the evolution of 
elapsed tenure, there are indeed some business cycle influences, which however 
cannot account fully for the observed pattern. In Figure 1 we see that in the recession 
of 1993-94 median tenure was higher than in the following years. But comparing 
1984 with 1994, two years with relatively similar growth rates of GDP we see that 
median tenure for the age group 26-45 has dropped from 9 to 7.5 years.  
 
A related and alternative explanation for the decline of job tenure is the increasing 
number of employees in West Germany, as increasing numbers of new hires lead to a 
decline in elapsed tenure. If new hires were the reason for decreasing job stability 
there wouldn't be anything to worry about, but the number of dependent employees 
has been on the decrease since 1993 as can be seen from Figure 4.  
 
If we rule out these two possibilities, the effects of the "usual suspects" could finally 
come into question: structural change, "globalization" and technological progress 
leading to both increased layoffs and quits as new job opportunities arise. The result 
would again be reduced average tenure in the economy. Astonishingly little is known 
on these interdependencies, while the effects on wage differentials have been of 
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some concern in recent years.8 Moreover, there are only a few studies up to the 
present moment by Booth et al. (1999) and Valetta (1999b), which focus on the 
reasons for increasing job instability. Booth et al. (1999) show that over a time span 
of around forty years the likelihood of one leaving his or her job in the UK has 
increased, with layoffs going up more than quits. This clearly illustrates the increased 
job instability in the 1980s. Valetta (1999b) shows that in the US male workers with 
substantial job tenure experienced a rising incidence of permanent layoffs between 
1976 and 1992. Keeping this in mind we now go on to explore the development of 
job duration and the reasons for separation in Germany in more detail.  
 
3. Do New Jobs Tend to End Early? 
A good way to look at the development of job duration is to refer to duration 
analysis. This type of analysis has several advantages: the model uses information on 
when jobs end exactly and it controls for right censoring of employment spells. 
Furthermore, looking at elapsed tenure (or even retention rate estimates) we only 
take into account whether jobs end (usually) within a year. The GSOEP, however, 
includes monthly information on job duration that should be exploited. Moreover, 
duration analysis allows the analysis of jobs in a multivariate setting by combining 
all observations in one single estimation, adding to the clarity of results. Usually, 
separate models for workers with different elapsed tenure are estimated instead.9 
Thus, our study is more in the tradition of the work by Booth et al. (1999) and 
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1999), who estimate hazard rate models as well. 
 
Still, it is important to note that the shift in the type of analysis also includes a shift in 
the perspective. First of all, we will only analyze the evolution of jobs that started 
after a certain date, in our case January 1985. This is not a problem here, as we are 
not so much interested in very long-lasting jobs for older workers. As shown in 
Figure 1 older workers experienced increases in median elapsed tenure in contrast to 
the overall downward trend. The likely reason could be separation rules, especially 
during that time period. Early retirement programs coupled with strict separation 
rules resulted in less hiring of older people, greatly influenced tenure at the upper end 
of the distribution.  
                                                 
8 See e.g. Katz and Murphy 1992; Levy and Murnane 1992; Krugman 1994; Leamer 1994 and 1996; 
Freeman and Katz 1995. 
9 For Logit regressions on the probability to be in short or long jobs see Mertens 1999.  
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Second, we sample jobs rather than people. As most people tend to be in long jobs, 
but most jobs are short lived, average duration of a job spell is rather short, compared 
to elapsed firm tenure (Topel and Ward 1992, Farber 1999). Indeed, we believe that 
testing the influence of those very short jobs is important when looking at the 
question of changing job stability as also done by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1999) and 
Mertens (1999). There might be sub-groups of workers who are especially harmed by 
the decrease in job duration by having to switch jobs frequently. The latter problem 
is the central question of our companion paper (Mertens and Bergemann 2000). Our 
focus here is on the reasons for separations. 
 
3.1 Empirical Modeling 
The basic tools to model duration data are survival functions )(xF  and hazard 
functions )(th  at some duration t . Duration t  is commonly defined as a measure of 
length of a spell between certain events.  
 
)(tF  gives the probability that a duration will last longer than t . Formally for 
continuous time: 
(1)     [ ] ∫−=−=≥= t dssftFtTPtF
0
)(1)(1)(   
with )(tF  denoting the distribution function. 
 
The hazard function )(th  gives the rate per time period at time t  that the probability 
of a spell terminating is amassed conditional on the spell not being terminated prior 
to t . For continuous duration the hazard function )(th  is defined by  
   
(2)    
)(
)(
)(1
)()(
tF
tf
tF
tfth =−=  
with )(tf  denoting the density function for some duration t.   
It should be noted, that the hazard and survival function are closely related (as well 
as with the density and the distribution function). One can be derived by the other 
using the following relationship.  
(3)     


−= ∫t dsshtF
0
)(exp)(  
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However, individuals might face different risks of terminating a spell according to 
their environmental and individual characteristics. Furthermore, the risk might 
change over the duration of a spell: an observation, which is commonly subsumed 
under the heading ‘duration dependence’. Consequently, the hazard function should 
be modeled such that it not only depends on time but also on covariates i.e.: 
 
(4)     );()( xtth θ=  
 
We choose the popular Semi-Parametric Proportional Cox Model as a basis for our 
estimation. The effects of covariates on the hazard rate are restricted in this model to 
be proportional. 
 
(5)    )'exp()();( 0 βθθ xtxt =  
 
The major advantage of this model is that it leaves the form of the so called ‘baseline 
hazard’ )(0 tθ  unspecified. Thus, no special assumption concerning the duration 
dependence is necessary.  
 
We extend this standard Cox Model in two ways in order to accommodate our 
question properly: First, it is specified in a competing risk form to distinguish 
between the determinants that are responsible for the different reasons of job 
termination. Consequently, when the hazard of dismissal is estimated, spells ending 
with termination due to quit or due to other reasons are recorded as censored, and 
vice versa. Also spells that end without an indicated reason are treated in this model 
as censored. 
 
Furthermore, it is intended to appropriately take into account the changing economic 
conditions as well as changing individual determinants over the length of a spell. 
Therefore, the model allows for time varying covariates on annual basis. The exit 
specific hazard rate of the Semi-Parametric Proportional Cox Model takes the form: 
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(6)   ))'(exp()())(;( 0 eee βtxtθtxtθ =  
 
where )(θ 0 te  is the ‘baseline’ hazard for the respective termination state (e) and )(tx  
stands for the time-varying covariates. These hazard rates are estimated, separately 
for each gender, as the employment behavior of men and women show clear 
differences.  
 
3.2 Multivariate Estimation Results 
Let us first have a look whether the risk that a job spell ends has increased in recent 
years. To receive results that are comparable to the analysis of elapsed tenure, we 
first ignore the reason for separation. We regress job duration on a time trend, 
whereby the time trend is modeled as a time varying variable which takes the value 1 
when the job was held in 1985, 2 when held in 1986 and so forth.10 The results are 
documented in Table 2.11 The data confirm the statements of the preceding analysis 
on elapsed tenure. We find a clear-cut tendency for a decline in job duration for men 
over time and a less obvious result for women. The coefficient on the time trend of 
job duration for women is only significant on the 10% level, but the sign on the 
coefficient points in the same direction as the one for men. 
 
Still, nothing is said so far on the reasons for the decline of job duration. However, 
with the analysis of spell data, we are now able to assess this question in a more 
differentiated analysis distinguishing jobs by their reasons of termination. As a first 
step, job duration until dismissal, quit or termination due to other reasons is again 
purely regressed on the time trend. Table 3 presents the estimation results. As the 
coefficients show, job duration of men until layoff decreased significantly over time. 
For women, no tendency over time can be observed. There are indications that job 
duration until quitting of men has slightly increased. Job duration of men and women 
ending out of other reasons decreased significantly over time.  
Further determinants, which are known to potentially influence job duration 
(compare e.g. Mertens 1998), are included in the econometric model to control for 
their influences on job duration. Three different types of covariates can be 
                                                 
10 It might seem to be a very restricted modelling of a time trend. However regression on a set of time 
dummies shows, that the assumption of linearity is justified.  
11 The coefficients have to be interpreted in the following way. A positive coefficient points out that 
an increasing value of the covariate leads to an increasing hazard of ending a job. 
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distinguished. Firstly, the growth rate of the real GDP is incorporated to capture the 
changes in the economic conditions of West Germany.12 Secondly, individual 
characteristics, which are known to influence job duration such as age and kind of 
professional education are included. Furthermore, job specific variables are 
considered, which comprise job status, part time status and industry affiliation.13  
Table 4 presents the estimation of the hazards of job termination for this model. Let 
us first consider the influence of the economic conditions on job duration. As 
expected, the state of the economy has a significant impact on job duration. In an 
economic slowdown, the risk of being given notice increases, whereas in an 
economic upturn, the odds to resign increase. Unlike men women face an increasing 
hazard of leaving due to other reasons in times of a positive economic development. 
These results prove again the importance to distinguish between business cycle 
influences and secular trends in job duration.14 A fact, which for example, Gottschalk 
and Moffitt (1999) did not consider. They include similar to our study a linear trend 
term for the year of observation in the analysis, but did not include measures of labor 
market tightness.  
 
The issue of particular interest is the evolution of layoffs and quits over time. 
Therefore, let us turn to the coefficient on the time trend. First, the results for men 
are reported. There is still a clear tendency towards an increase in the hazard of being 
laid-off in this model. The coefficient is positive and significant. The hazard of 
quitting, on the other hand, is not influenced by the time. There is still an increasing 
trend in the hazard of leaving a job due to other reasons. The hazard of being laid off 
for women shows no significant tendency. The quits of women depict also no 
significant change. However, like men, women face an increasing hazard of leaving 
the job due to other reasons.  
 
This decrease of the job duration of men and women until termination due to other 
reasons might be on the one hand side the result of the extended early retirement 
programs and so called ‘social plans’. With the aid of the social plans to reduce the 
workforce, it was a relatively frequent practice to dissolve the working contract of 
older workers while paying the difference between unemployment benefits up to the 
                                                 
12 Data is taken from the Federal Statistic Office Germany .  
13 Due to data problems firm size could not yet been considered. 
14  However, the significance of the coefficient on the growth rate in the model of layoffs of men on 
the 10% level might indicate that the relationship is not as simple as it is modelled here. 
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year of early retirement (Börsch-Supan and Schnabel 1997). This can be interpreted 
as a  kind of discharge in early retirement, which often occurred in mutual 
agreement. And additionally for women the change in the regulation of maternity 
leave might play a certain role. From 1985 onwards, the protected maternity leave 
increased in steps from 6 months to three years in 1992 (Ondrich et. al., 1998). This 
longer period of absence gives an incentive to leave the job with the protection of 
maternity leave instead of, for example, resigning. 
 
The results concerning the influence of age on job duration can be summarized as 
follows: Young men at the age of 25 to 34 years are less likely to be laid off. 
Voluntary quitting is, however, more likely the younger the workers are and the 
probability to leave the job due to other reason decreases first with age but increases 
again in the age of 55 and older.  
 
This fact as well as the argumentation on the early retirement programs and 
maternity leave suggests a special influence of age on job duration. Therefore, we 
interact the time trend with the age dummies. As Table 5 shows, especially young 
and middle aged men are subject to the increase of the risk of being laid-offs. With 
respect to the hazard of job termination due to other reasons it has to be noted that 
being 45 to 54 years old increases slightly the trend towards shorter jobs. This might 
give some evidence for the conjecture that the increase in the odds to leave due to 
other reasons might be – at least partly - another form of an increase of the odds of 
being laid off. Furthermore, the negative significant coefficients on the interaction 
terms support the suggestion that the change of maternity leave legislation influenced 
the coefficient on termination due to other reasons. However, there is still a common 
trend towards shorter jobs due to other reason left, which cannot be explained with 
the arguments at hand. 
 
Further results on the determinants of job duration can be summarized as follows. 
The job status plays a crucial role in determining job duration. Being a skilled blue or 
white collar worker results in a prolonged job for men, whereas there is practically 
no influence of vocational education on the risk to end a job. Surprisingly, being a 
part-timer significantly decreases the odds of being laid off and increases the odds of 
quitting for men. Finally the results concerning industry affiliation should be 
reported. As expected, industry affiliation influences job duration, too. The dummies 
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are in all specifications except for women quitting and leaving due to other reasons 
jointly significant. The direction of the effects is also less surprising. For example, 
working in the construction industry increases the hazard of being laid off, whereas 
working in public administration reduces the risk. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Our results support the view that job stability in Western Germany has declined since 
the mid-1980s. However, not all demographic groups in the labor market are equally 
affected. Using repeated cross sections from the German Socioeconomic Panel 
(GSOEP) we show that male workers have experienced a decrease in median elapsed 
tenure from 10.7 years to 9.3 years between 1984 and 1997. While women in other 
countries like the U.S. or the UK were able to accrue higher median tenure on 
average, there has not been such an increase in Germany between 1984 and 1997.  
 
These simple cross sectional results are confirmed in our multivariate analysis where 
we control for the business cycle as well as demographic and job characteristics. 
Estimating a Cox Model we show that the risk of job termination for men has 
increased over the observation period. Extending our analysis to a competing risks 
form we are able to show that this increase was caused primarily by an increase of 
layoffs and terminations due to other reasons, while the hazard of quits does not 
change significantly. Women on the other hand face an increasing hazard of leaving 
a job due to other reasons only. We argue that this increase in the risk to leave a job 
due to other reasons is partly  due to extended early retirement-programs and changes 
in the maternity leave legislation. Workforce reductions via discharge in early 
retirement were relatively common during that period. Moreover, the increase in 
possible maternity leave from 6 months to three years reduced the number of women 
quitting their jobs after childbearing.  
 
Considering these results it is certainly exaggerated to talk about a serious 
deterioration in job stability, as we are not sure whether this is a long term trend. 
Still, there is room for concern. Increasing layoffs go hand in hand with obvious 
negative consequences for the individual if no alternative job is found immediately, 
which cannot be assumed to be the case with unemployment rates at around 10%. 
Though wage losses upon re-employment are not as large as in the United States for 
 15
the majority of workers, prolonged unemployment may lead to severe income losses 
(compare Burda and Mertens 2000). Moreover, it could be the case that increasing 
layoff risks affect 'outsiders' more seriously leading to a stronger dualization of the 
labor market. In our companion paper (Mertens and Bergemann 2000) we show that 
there is some evidence for this hypothesis. Finally, with men being increasingly 
exposed to layoffs, the willingness to accrue education and specific capital may be 
limited. On the other hand it could be argued that the decrease in job stability simply 
shows that the German economy is adjusting to the globalization and technological 
innovation process. That the economy is even becoming more flexible with positive 
side effects on the macroeconomic development however is to be questioned in view 
of  persistently high unemployment rates. Further studies which shed light on the 
background of this development are clearly needed.  
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Appendix 
Tables 
Table 1 - Median Tenure in Years  
 
 Men Women 
 Median tenure 
 
Observations Median tenure Observations 
1984 10.7 2522 6.3 1598 
1985 10.5 2620 5.8 1701 
1986 10.3 2473 6.3 1605 
1987 10.4 2426 6.7 1568 
1988 10.5 2303 6.6 1552 
1989 10.1 2243 6.6 1538 
1990 9.7 2216 6.2 1563 
1991 9.7 2223 6.5 1576 
1992 9.7 2157 6.5 1544 
1993 9.6 2133 6.5 1552 
1994 9.6 2059 6.8 1509 
1995 9.5 2015 6.6 1459 
1996 9.1 2007 7.0 1481 
1997 9.3 1970 6.0 1475 
 
Note: All observations are weighted by the GSOEP sample weight. 
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 1984-1997. Only German citizens living in West 
Germany (Sample A), full-time and part-time workers, without observations with missing values on 
age, sex and tenure.  
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Table 2 – Estimation Results of the Hazard of Job Termination a 
 Men Women 
Time Trend .039** .025+ 
 (.015) (.014) 
Log Likelihood -4102.1 -4722.5 
(LR Chi²) (7.29) (3.29) 
No of Observations 1166 1212 
No of Destination States 635 733 
a Robust standard errors in brackets and one* indicates significance at the 5% significance level, ** at 
the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level. 
Source: Own calculation using the GSOEP. Only German citizens living in West Germany (Sample 
A) full-time and part-time employees, without missing values on age, sex, education, job status and 
industry affiliation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Estimation Results of the Competing Risk Model of the Hazard of Job 
Terminationa 
 Men Women 
Job Ended by: Layoff Quit  Other 
Reasons 
Layoff Quit  Other 
Reasons
Time Trend .143** -.038+ .075* .058 -.028 .068* 
 (.033) (.022) (.038) (.037) (.022) .(027) 
Log Likelihood -963.1 1867.6 -606.9 -793.5 -1745.1 -1112.2 
(LR Chi²) (19.07) (3.13) (3.89) (2.47) (1.55) (6.41) 
No of Observations 1166 1166 1166 1212 1212 1212 
No of Destination States 151 291 94 125 270 173 
a Robust standard errors in brackets and one* indicates significance at the 5% significance level, ** at 
the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level. 
Source: Own calculation using the GSOEP. Only German citizens living in West Germany (Sample 
A) full-time and part-time employees, without missing values on age, sex, education, job status and 
industry affiliation. 
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Table 4: Estimation Results of the Competing Risk Model of the Hazard of Job 
Termination – Reference Modela 
 
 Men Women 
Job Ended by:  Layoff Quit Other 
Reasons 
Layoff Quit Other 
Reasons 
Time Trend .127** -.014 .093* .019 .016 .136** 
 (.037) (.025) (.047) (.041) (.026) (.037) 
Growth Rate of Real GDP -.077+ .089** .056 -.149** .084** .143** 
 (.042) (.031) (.056) (.041) (.033) (.050) 
Age:       
Base Category: 18-24 years        
   25-34 years .-515* -.084 -.885** .040 -.168 .342+ 
 (.249) (.170) (.278) (.248) (.158) (.211) 
   35-44 years -.201 -.383+ -1.048** -.079 -.333+ -.536* 
 (.264) (.200) (.347) .266 (.183) (.270) 
   45-54 years .207 -1.025** -2.311** -.084 -1.155** -.838* 
 (.295) (.322) (.741) (.336) (.209) (.364) 
   55 years and older .184 -1.148* .258 .122 -1.709* -.019 
 (.423) (.495) (.375) (.546) (.685) (.430) 
Vocational Education:       
Base Category: 
    No Vocational Education 
      
   Vocational Training -.088 .306 .148 .062 .077 .095 
 (.244) (.203) (.318) (.251) (.178) (.209) 
   College Degree -.377 .435+ .286 -.129 .033 .670* 
 (.390) (.257) (.441) (.488) (.305) (.305) 
Part-time Status: -1.817+ .656* .312 -.401+ .145 .055 
 (.992) (.293) (.542) (.212) (.141) (.175) 
Job Status:       
Base Category:  
   Less Skilled Blue Collar 
      
   Skilled Blue Collar -.397+ -.220 -.488+ .012 .083 -.439 
 (.225) (.179) (.275) (.411) (.291) (.404) 
   Less Skilled White Collar .228 .274 -.620 -.112 .379+ .301 
 (.396) (.277) (.588) (.306) (.221) (.278) 
   Skilled White Collar -.621** -.382* -.890** -.457+ -.054 -.342 
 (.242) (.188) (.338) (.266) (.194) (.234) 
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Table 4 continued…. 
 
 Men Women 
Job Ended by:  Layoff Quit Other 
Reasons 
Layoff Quit Other 
Reasons 
Industry Affiliation       
Base Category:  Manufacturing       
   Utility -1.000 -1.879+ .537  .715 .948 
 (1.042) (1.023) (.530)  (.618) (.667) 
   Construction .687** .039 .153 .795+ -.417 .114 
 (.221) (.189) (.323) (.441) (.494) (.436) 
  Distribution  .464+ .401* .117 .492+ .188 -.074 
 (.272) (.203) (.385) (.253) (.193) (.249) 
   Transportation  .213 -.193 -.829 -.349 -.111 -.376 
 (.309) (.258) (.580) (.753) (.464) (.605) 
   Banking   .060 -.067 -.689 -.230 -1.048+ 
  (.305) (.764) (.613) (.342) (.590) 
  Services  .344 .409* .817** -.045 .152 .109 
 (.272) (.180) (.297) (.267) (.182) (.216) 
  Public Administration -1.909+ -.471 1.011* -2.265* -.155 -.029 
 (1.034) (.369) (.402) (1.009) (.280) (.315) 
Log Likelihood -931.9 -1836.5 -580.4 -770.2 -1723.2 -1080.8 
(LR Chi²) (84.11) (59.95) (82.55) (39.08) (41.41) (64.06) 
No of Observations 1166 1166 1166 1212 1212 1212 
No of Destination States 151 291 94 125 270 173 
a Robust standard errors in brackets and one* indicates significance at the 5% significance level, ** at 
the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level. 
Source: Own calculation using the GSOEP. Only German citizens living in West Germany (Sample 
A) full-time and part-time employees, without missing values on age, sex, education, job status and 
industry affiliation 
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Table 5: Estimation Results of the Competing Risk Model of the Hazard of Job 
Termination – Extended Modela 
 Men Women 
Job Ended by:  Layoff Quit Other 
Reasons 
Layoff Quit Other 
Reasons 
Time Trend .281** -.071 .132* -.029 -.045 .255** 
 (.081) (.573) (.064) (.613) (.041) (.059) 
Growth Rate of Real GDP -.074+ .091** .057 -.152** .093** .137** 
 (.042) (.032) (.056) (.041) (.033) (.050) 
Age:       
Base Category: 18-24 years        
   25-34 years 1.349 -.652 -.160 -.689 -.924* 1.540* 
 (.967) (.500) (-.838) (.834) (.448) (.652) 
   35-44 years 1.317 -.819 -.361 -1.478 -.869+ .876 
 (1.030) (.592) (1.045) (1.001) (.513) (.815) 
   45-54 years 1.467 -1.050 -13.971* .648 -2.714** 1.133 
 (1.284) (1.015) (7.118) (.961) (1.042) (1.778) 
   55 years and older 3.411* -2.466 -.125 2.760 -9.336** 4.079+ 
 (1.378) (1.721) (1.373) (1.934) (1.176) (2.220) 
Time Trend *Age:       
Base Category:  
   Time Trend* 18-24 years  
      
   Time Trend* 25-34 years -.198* .074 -.082 .083 .093+ -.137* 
 (.095) (.063) (.090) (.089) (.052) (.066) 
   Time Trend*35-44 years -.162+ .059 -.075 .150 .069 -.158+ 
 (.100) (.071) (.109) (.102) (.059) (.083) 
   Time Trend*45-54 years -.136 .011 .990+ -.075 .180+ -.222 
 (.124) (.118) (.579) (.106) (.108) (.198) 
   Time Trend*55 years and older -.348* .155 .033 -.256 .706** -.436+ 
 (.148) (.178) (.134) (.207) (.104) (.239) 
Vocational Education:       
Base Category:  
    No Vocational Education 
      
   Vocational Training -.106 .317 .129 .064 .085 -.123 
 (.245) (.204) (.323) (.252) (.179) (.210) 
   College Degree -.409 .454+ .259 -.144 .075 .688* 
 (.384) (.259) (.445) (.496) (.307) (.301) 
Part Time Status: -1.863+ .672* .301 -.398+ .155 .061 
 (.981) (.295) (.544) (.213) (.142) (.177) 
Job Status:       
Base Category:  
   Less Skilled Blue Collar 
      
   Skilled Blue Collar -.374+ -.228 -.470+ .013 .079 -.423 
 (.224) (.180) (.280) (.413) (.389) (.407) 
   Less Skilled White Collar .212 .268 -.602 -.166 .382+ .321 
 (.398) (.277) (.592) (.307) (.224) (.279) 
   Skilled White Collar -.587* .395* -.870* -.469+ -.046 -.304 
 (.246) (.189) (.345) (.264) (.193) (.234) 
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Table 5 continued… 
 
 Men Women 
Job Ended by:  Layoff Quit Other 
Reasons 
Layoff Quit Other 
Reasons 
Industry affiliation       
Base Category:  Manufacturing       
   Utility -.922 -1.905+ .580    
 (1.046) (1.025) (.540)    
   Construction  .694** .038 .160 .826+ -.448 .047 
 (.221) (.190) (.323) (.440) (.490) (.436) 
  Distribution  .459+ .404* .103 .492+ .159 -.131 
 (.272) (.204) (.386) (.255) (.191) (.246) 
   Transportation .190 -.190 -.814 -.357 -.159 -.449 
 (.309) (.258) (.590) (.764) (.460) (.625) 
   Banking   .048 -.066 -.645 -.274 -1.078+ 
  (.305) (.766) (.611) (.339) (.590) 
  Services  .361 .406* .820** .031 .117 .051 
 (.272) (.181) (.296) (.269) (.180) (.210) 
  Public Administration8 -1.901+ -.476 .980* -2.268* -.202 -.067 
 (1.034) (.369) (.415) (1.006) (.280) (.313) 
Log Likelihood -928.1 -1835.5 -578.1 -767.1 -1720.6 -1077.9 
(LR Chi²) 97.48 62.21 93.63 47.62 96.55 71.97 
No of Observations 1166 1166 1166 1212 1212 1212 
No of Destination States 151 291 94 125 270 173 
a Robust standard errors in brackets and one* indicates significance at the 5% significance level, ** at 
the 1% significance level and + at the 10% significance level. 
Source: Own calculation using the GSOEP. Only German citizens living in West Germany (Sample 
A) full-time and part-time employees, without missing values on age, sex, education, job status and 
industry affiliation 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 - The Evolution of Median Elapsed Tenure by Age Groups 
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Figure 2 - The Evolution of Median Elapsed Tenure by Hours Worked 
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Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP (sample A). 
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Figure 3 - The Evolution of Median Elapsed Tenure by Industry 
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Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP (sample A). 
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Figure 4 - Unemployment and the Business Cycle in West Germany  
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Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland and Amtliche 
Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit. 
 
 
